In contrast, the courts have, for the most part, been friendly to mandatory arbitration even though the law of arbitration has been unsettled since 1991. In the last two years, however, there have been two U.S. Supreme Court and at least four circuit-court cases that have clarified the law and made it clear that employers can implement such policies as a term and condition of employment. The purpose of this article is to explain the law pertaining to mandatory arbitration. Before discussing arbitration's legality, however, it is necessary to ex plain why a growing number of employers consider manda tory arbitration a sound policy.
Why Employers Choose Arbitration
The short answer to why employers seek arbitration is the cost of litigation. Employment-discrimination suits are a growth industry in the United States. In 1989 employees filed 63,898 discrimination claims with the EEOC; in 2001 employees filed 80,840 discrimination charges, a 26-percent increase in 10 years.2 Furthermore, those numbers under represent the actual number of discrimination claims, because employees file a similar number of claims with affiliated state and local agencies. It is not, however, the number of legitimate claims that trouble employers. Instead, it is the expense of the process, the number of frivolous claims, and the perverse incentives inherent in this adjudication process that leads employers and employees alike to conclude that the system is broken.
To file a discrimination lawsuit, employees must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or an affiliated state agency.3 The EEOC has almost always tried to convince the parties to settle. If the parties do not settle at its prompt ing, the EEOC investigates the claim and ren ders its opinion as to whether there is "reason able cause" to believe that the plaintiff has been discriminated against.4 Regardless of whether the EEOC "finds cause," the agency then issues a "right to sue" letter.5 This letter "allows" the plain tiff to file a claim in federal court. In an extraor dinarily small percentage of the cases filed, the EEOC decides that the issue is so important that the agency should litigate on the plaintiff's behalf.
2 See: "U.S. Equal Employment O pportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Statistics FY 1986 -1996 (May 1997 § 2000e-5 (1994) . Employees can elect to file with the federal, state, or local agency. In most circumstances, the agencies exer cise concurrent jurisdiction so that claims are cross-filed among each agency. In other circumstances, the local agency stands on its own so that employees can have their claims investigated m ore than once. T he C ity o f Chicago's Hum an Rights Law is an example of the situation where an employee can pursue two claims simultaneously. 4 Id. 5 O ne commentator, Michael Selmi, notes that the EEOC often informs the plaintiff of its intention to issue a no cause finding before doing so to afford the plaintiff an op portunity to request a right-to-sue notice. See: Michael Selmi, "The Value o f the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency' s Role in Employment Discrimination Law," 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 9 n . 35 (1996) .
In the years 1992-2000, the EEOC resolved between 68,366 and 106,312 cases each year.6The EEOC classifies each resolved case as either (1) a merit resolution (i.e., a settlement, a withdrawal with benefits, or finding of "cause") or (2) a non-merit resolution ("no cause" finding or administrative closing).7 With regard to merit resolutions during those years ('92-'00), the parties settled or "with drew the case with benefits" in 7 percent to 13.2 percent of the cases, while EEOC found cause in fewer than 9 percent of the remaining cases each year (and only 2.3 percent in at least one year).8 O f the remaining non-merit resolutions, the EEOC found no reasonable cause in 48.1 percent to 61 percent of the cases during those years, and admin istratively closed 20.5 percent to 36.3 percent of the cases.9 Overall non-merit resolutions comprised 78.7 percent to 90.9 percent of the resolutions.10 I suggest three possible explanations for the large number of no-cause findings; (1) employees do not understand the law, (2) the EEOC is failing to find cause in cases with merit, or (3) employees are fil ing frivolous claims hoping for nuisance setdements (that is, being paid a setdement to close the case regardless of its merit).11 Even if each explanation accounts for a third of those cases closed adminis tratively or due to a no-cause finding, it would still mean that 26 percent to 30 percent of the cases filed in each of the last ten years were frivolous. In addition, discrimination investigators and defense lawyers contend that a substantial percentage of the merit resolutions include frivolous cases that were setded for nuisance values.12 6 U.S. Equal Employment O pportunity Commission web site, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (as viewed on Janu ary 13, 2002 Frivolous claims do not just injure lawabiding employers. An abundance of frivolous claims burdens the entire system and draws re sources away from meritorious cases. Without sufficient resources to devote to the EEOC' s everburgeoning caseload, it is likely that some legiti mate claims-especially ones filed by employees with legitimate claims but who are not repre sented by attorneys-may slip through the cracks. The unfortunate result is that both employees and employers become cynical toward the sys tem. This is a logical result when em ployees make legitimate claims that are not adequately redressed and employ ers who diligently comply with the federal and state discrimination laws are extorted.
The current system for resolving discrimination claims results in a sys tem that provides perverse incentives for employees and employers with intent to de ceive. W ith workloads continuing to increase at the same time that budgets remain relatively fixed, agencies are compelled to resolve claims in a more efficient manner by attempting to induce parties to settle.13 But when settlement becomes the overwhelming goal, the merits of each indi vidual case tend to lose their significance, thereby creating an opportunity and incentive for em ployees to file frivolous claims. Employers, in turn, have an incentive to settle claims, even if they are frivolous, because of the high costs of the agencies' investigations and the even moreexorbitant costs of prospective litigation.
Responding to an agency's investigation may cost an employer, depending on the complexity and location of the case, between $2,500 and $10,000.14 Litigating a case through trial costs the employer at least $50,000 and could exceed $500,000.15 In most cases, the available damages are a fraction of the costs of defense, and there is always the possibility of losing at trial. Defense lawyers believe that juries are unpredictable and fear that they are inclined to award large sums of money to the plaintiff in damages and attorneys' fees that they may not deserve. 16 "Bad actors" exploit the economic realities of the current system by using the costs of litiga tion to their benefit. Employers will have greater incentive to settle as long as the settlement fig ure is less than what it would cost to successfully defend a case before the EEOC or in federal or state court. The result is what appears as a sys tem of litigation extortion that can be euphemis tically referred to as "defacto severance."17 All the while, employees with legitimate claims may be forced to accept settlement offers representing but a small fraction of the real value of their cases because they cannot afford the time and money it takes to litigate.
Mediation. Instead of addressing the problems relating to litigation, the EEOC and others have sidestepped the issue by promoting mediation to resolve disputes. Mediation has great appeal be cause it is not, by definition, adversarial. Instead, 16 By means of an anecdotal illustration, a team of defense lawyers conducted a mock jury trial before the actual trial of a case brought by a plaintiff who was diagnosed as a patho logical liar by the defense-side s psychologist. Plaintiff had no supporting facts or witnesses to bolster her allegations of sexual harassment levied against a supervisor. Some of the mock-trial jurors awarded the plaintiff some damages not because they believed that she was sexually harassed, but rather because they felt sorry for her. Unbeknownst to the mock jury, awarding her even a modest sum may trig ger a potentially exorbitant award of attorneys' fees. Suffice it to say that the frightening and somewhat surreal mockjury experience convinced the employer to settle the case. 17 Sherwyn etal., "Mandatory Arbitration," supra note 4, at 82 (defining "de facto severance" as a process whereby em ployees file baseless discrimination charges because they know that their former employers are willing to pay a nomi nal amount of money to avoid the aggravation, costs, and losses of time, resources, and productivity that inevitably arise in defending such allegations).
When settlement becomes the over whelm ing goal, the merits of each in dividual case lose their significance, thereby creating an incentive for em ployees to file frivolous claims.... the parties, in theory, work together to come to mutually acceptable resolutions. While the theory of mediation is appealing, the reality leaves much to be desired.
In EEOC-sponsored mediations, the media tors do not examine the merits of the cases. In stead, the mediators simply attempt to reach a settlement. Another way to describe this situa tion is to simply ask: what will the employer pay and what will the employee accept to walk away? Inevitably, such a system results in employees extorting innocent employers and guilty employ ers exploiting employees who have suffered dis crimination but are unable to obtain competent counsel.
Mediation does not resolve the issues associ ated with employment discrimination. Instead, it exacerbates the problems by institutionalizing de facto severance. Still, it does make sense to examine alternative methods to resolve disputes (rather than working through the courts). Such a system must provide a low-cost adjudication forum that discourages both employer discrimi nation and employee extortion. Mandatory ar bitration may be the answer.
The Arbitration Alternative
Arbitrators adjudicate cases in a fraction of the time and for significantly less cost than when the parties go into litigation.18 With arbitration, wellmeaning employers would no longer be extorted into hasty settlements by the high costs of litiga Rev. 1017 Rev. , 1039 Rev. (1996 (noting that the arbitrator's fees could easily exceed $1,000). See also: Sherwyn et al., "Mandatory Arbitration," supra note 4, at 132-133 (arguing that $1,000 may be a paltry sum in com parison to the legal fees accrued during litigation). tion, while truly wronged employees would not face unattainable barriers to receiving the dam ages to which they are entitled. Conversely, damage-seeking employees will be unable to lever age de facto severance payments and will receive litde or nothing at all. Moreover, employers with bad intentions will be unable to force a plaintiffemployee to accept an otherwise less-than-deserved setdement. Instead, such employers will likely pay full damages (or closer to full damages than in some other settlement). Therefore, in compari son to alternative forms of dispute reso lution, like mediation, and in compari son w ith traditional litigation, arbitration offers the parties savings in costs and time as well as incentives that may actually hinder discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Mandatory arbitration's advantages have compelled many employers to implement lawful mandatory-arbitration pro grams. Such programs are an effective means for employers to pool the risk of liability for being sued for unfounded claims and to resolve sub stantiated claims without fear of financial ruin or incurring bad publicity. Certainly, many em ployers in the United States that have already implemented such programs believe that the ben efits of such risk-pooling far outweigh the disad vantages of mandatory arbitration (chiefly, that arbitrators' decisions cannot usually be appealed, and the lack of a guarantee that the arbitrator selected will fully understand the applicable laws).19
There are some, however, who argue that ar bitration is not a suitable forum for resolving employment disputes. Many of these arguments are based on social policies that are beyond the scope of this article. The remaining arguments, which are addressed and confronted below, ques tion the legality of mandatory arbitration pursu ant to federal and state law.
19 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) reports that more than 700 employers have mandatory-arbitration sys tems under which the AAA is designated as the agency to administer the program. That information was presented by the general counsel at a research conference on domestic and international arbitration sponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration, at NYU Law School, September 20, 2002. ...Employers, in turn, have an incentive to settle claims, even if they are friv o lous, because of the high costs of the agencies' investigations and the ex orbitant costs of prospective litigation.
The Law of Mandatory Arbitration
The lawfulness of arbitration of disputes arising out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended),20 the Age Discrimination in Em ployment Act (ADEA),21 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)22 has been the subject of at least five U.S. Supreme Court cases,23 as well as countless circuit-court opinions, district-court opinions, and law-review articles.24 For the most part, the debate has focused on four areas: (1) the role of the EEOC, (2) whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to employment contracts, (3) what constitutes a "fair" arbitra tion agreement, and (4) the effect of Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Now, after ten years of debate,25 the first two issues have been resolved. Alternatively, the lat ter two issues remain unsettled despite the fact that there is a substantial amount of judicial au thority on these topics. The section below ex plains the development of the law concerning each of those issues.
The Change in the Law
Prior to 1991 lawyers, judges, and scholars gen erally accepted that mandatory-arbitration agree ments were unenforceable with regard to cases filed under federal anti-discrimination statutes.26 That position was based on Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co?1 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee could proceed with a Title VII claim even after she suffered an adverse deci sion in a labor-arbitration award handed down pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement.28 The lower courts extended this holding to the nonunion setting and, thus, for some years it seemed clear that mandatory-arbitration agree ments were unenforceable. 29 The court left open several questions, however. Two of the mostdebated issues concerned the role of the EEOC and the scope and applicability of the FAA. The Court finally resolved these issues in its EEOC v. Waffle House and Circuit City v. Adams decisions.
The Role of the EEOC As explained above, employees must file charges of discrimination with the EEOC before filing lawsuits in federal court. After its investigation, the EEOC can attempt to settle the case, issue a right-to-sue letter, or sue on behalf of the plain tiff. The advent of pre-dispute mandatory arbi tration has led to these three questions: (1) Can 20 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2000el7 (1994 the employees still file claims with the EEOC?, (2) Can the EEOC still file lawsuits on behalf of employees?, and (3) If so, may the agency seek money damages, or is it limited to seeking in junctive relief?
The first question was definitively answered by the Gilmer court, which stated: "An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agree ment will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action. Indeed, Gilmer filed a charge with the EEOC in this case."30 The U.S. Supreme Court answered the second ques tion when, in response to Gilmers contention that arbitration was an inappropriate forum for class actions and equitable relief, it stated: "arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief."31 Refuting this argument did not, how ever, end the controversy regarding the role of the EEOC. Instead, it created the third question. In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.32 and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v In Waffle House the court held that the EEOC has the right to seek monetary relief for the plain tiffs on whose behalf it sued, and based its hold ing on two grounds: (1) Gilmer did not limit the EEOC to seeking injunctive relief, it just stated that the EEOC could pursue such cases; and (2) limiting the EEOC to injunctive relief has no support in statutory law or public policy. Under the law, the EEOC has the right to en force the discrimination laws. One method of such enforcement is through litigation. If a court held that the EEOC could not sue for monetary damages, that holding would impair the agency' s ability to enforce the law-given that most vio lations are settled by monetary payments. It is unlikely that employees who believe that they have been discrim inated against would go through the pains of litigation just so that the EEOC could get an order preventing the em ployer from engaging in such conduct. Thus, preventing the EEOC from pursuing money damages would essentially allow an employer and employee to contract away the EEOC's right and obligation to enforce the law.
Although Waffle House represents a significant legal holding and resolved an important open question, the popular press has treated this hold ing as if it had much greater practical effect on employers than it actually does. In fact, the hold ing will have little or no effect on the vast major ity of employers because the EEOC litigates a minuscule fraction of the discrimination charges it receives. For example, in the year 2000, the EEOC received just under 80,000 discrimina tion charges and filed lawsuits in only 291 cases (that's less than one-third of one percent of those filed). In that same year, private plaintiffs filed 21,032 cases. Thus, the EEOC accounted for less than 2 percent of all federal-court cases.36
Further, the cases litigated by the EEOC are not the type that mandatory arbitration was de signed to address. Employers enact mandatoryarbitration policies to avoid the incentive for employees to file frivolous claims that lead em ployers to pay de facto severance. The Waffle House ruling will have no effect on those types of situa tions because the EEOC does not litigate garden-variety cases. Instead, the EEOC only litigates cases that involve a novel or unsettled area of law, or a class action. Those are the types of cases that belong in court because it is neces sary for courts, not arbitrators, to develop the law by providing precedent for employers, em ployees, and arbitrators to follow. 24 (1983) ; see: supra note 5. 35 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The statute in its entirety provides: "Maritime transactions," as herein defined, mean charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 40 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n. 2. This minor detail spawned hundreds of lawsuits over the past decade and cost litigants millions of dollars. 41 See: id. at 25 n. 2. The court noted: Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. §1. Several amici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that that section excludes from the coverage of the FAA all "contracts of employment." Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in the courts below; it was not addressed there; and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. See 9 U.S.C. § § 2, 3. The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration applica tion, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue uni formly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration applications (citations omitted). Unlike the dissent (citation omitted), we choose to follow the plain language of the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold that § I s exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer' s arbitration agreement. Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae. 42 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 43 Two Circuits had not ruled on the issue while the Ninth Circuit was an outlier. 44 Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3rd 889 (9th Cir. 2002) . Hereafter, "Circuit City II."
The Federal Arbitration Act
At the time of the enactment of the FAA in 1925, courts generally mistrusted arbitration as an ad judicative process and often refused to enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate in a variety of set tings.37 Congress enacted the FAA to statutorily remedy that mistrust. In the broadest and most simple terms, the FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."38 Section 1 of the FAA, however, excludes from the act's coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."39 In Gilmer, the arbitration agreement at issue was held not to be an employment contract because the parties to the agreement were the New York Stock Exchange and Gilmer, not the "employer" and the "employee."40 Because the agreement that plaintiff Gilmer signed was not a condition of employment imposed on him directly by his employer, the court elected not to address the question of whether the term "engaged in for-explained that it assesses procedural unconscionability by considering the "equilibrium between the parties and the extent to which the contract clearly discloses its terms."45 The court then stated that it determined substantive unconscionability by deciding "whether the terms of the con tract are unduly harsh."46 In Circuit City II the court held that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscio nable. The section below both explains and criti cally examines the rationale behind the court's determinations.
A bad deal. The key factor in the court's de termination that the Circuit City agreement was procedurally unconscionable is the fact that the company offered the contract, as a condition of employment, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Ac cording to the court, because Circuit City had considerably more bargaining power than did its employees, and because the employees could not modify the agreement in any way, the agreement was a contract of adhesion and, thus, unconscio nable. The Circuit City II court also held that the arbitration agreement itself was substantively unconscionable. The agreement did, in fact, have a number of problems. Specifically, the agree ment: (1) limited the available damages, (2) lim ited the statute of limitations, (3) required the employees to pay a portion of the arbitration fees, and-most tellingly (4) did not prevent the em ployer from bringing an action in court-yet it prevented employees from doing so.
The first two reasons for finding the Circuit City agreement unconscionable are both ratio nal and easy to correct. It simply makes no sense to allow employers and employees to sign away their rights to collect damages or to revise the statute of limitations. The reason for arbitration is to avoid the costs, delays, and perverse incen tives associated with litigation-but in so doing it should not take the teeth out of the law. Re ducing the damages and revising the statute of limitations does, indeed, take the teeth out of the law by making it difficult and less desirable for employees to pursue their claims under the law.
The third issue-who pays the cost of arbi tration?-is more complex, but still easy to cor rect. The issue is complicated because some com mentators have raised concerns that arbitrators may be corrupted if the employer pays the entire cost. To support this argument, commentators focus on the fact that employers will often con tract with the American Arbitration Association or another alternative-dispute-resolution (ADR) provider. The argument is that such organizations will be reluctant to find against the employer if it is paying the full cost. Yet that argument fails for two reasons. First, ADR providers simply cre-
The reason fo r arbitration is to avoid the costs, delays, and perverse incentives asso ciated w ith litig a tio n -but in so doing it should not take the teeth out of the law.
ate a panel of arbitrators from which the lawyers on each side choose. A plaintiff' s lawyer will never choose an arbitrator who is influenced by the fact that the employer is paying the entire cost. Sec ond, the ADR organization does not care who pays, as long as the employer contracts with that organization. Thus, if the organization really is corrupt, it will support its client, the employer, regardless of who pays. Accordingly, if courts want to protect employees from corrupt ADRs,47 then the courts need to prohibit employers from contracting with just one or two organizations and, instead, require that arbitration agree ments allow multiple ADR organizations to sub mit panels to the parties. I could find no case that requires such a clause. Moreover, that re search did not uncover any case where a court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement be cause the employer agreed to pay the entire cost of arbitration.
Conversely, there are a number of cases where courts denied a motion to compel arbitration because the employee had to pay the costs. In one of the lead cases on this issue, Cole v. Burns Intern. Sec. Services,48 the court found it to be
47 There is no evidence to support the proposition that any of the organizations are corrupt or that employees need pro tection from them. 48 1 05 F.3d. 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
"unreasonable" for the employee to share the cost of the arbitrator that could be as much as $ 1,000 per day. The court did not, however, refuse to compel arbitration. Instead, it simply "blue pen ciled"49 the agreement by shifting all the costs to the employer. The majority of courts have not, however, followed such a procedure. Instead, most courts will enforce an arbitration agreement even if it forces the employee to pay some por tion of the adjudication-process cost.50 For em ployers, the cost issue is easy to sum up: (1) en sure the enforceability by paying all costs, or (2) require employees to share in costs and hope the court will uphold the agreement. Indeed, in most cases the court will.
Failed mutuality. The fourth issue raised by Circuit City II was that, under the agreement, employees could not litigate disputes with the employer in court, but employers could bring a court action against its employees. This lack of mutuality is the basis on which a number of courts refuse to compel arbitration.51 On its face, requiring mutuality makes sense. Why should an employer be allowed to use the courts while an employee cannot? One answer is that the two sides pursue different claims that provide differ ent types of relief. Employees pursue discrimi nation, contract, and tort claims to obtain back pay, reinstatement, attorney' s fees, and punitive and compensatory damages. Arbitrators can award those types of damages. Employers' claims, however, often consist of enforcing non-compe tition or trade-secret agreements. In those cases, the employer needs a court to immediately grant an injunction to prevent the employee from caus ing irreparable harm by violating such an agree ment. Arbitration is not designed to provide such immediate relief. If courts insist on mutu ality, arbitration may be inappropriate for em ployers that need to enforce trade-secret or non competition agreements. Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4lh 83 (Cal. 2000) .
Circuit City II is a difficult case to interpret because the court' s ruling criticizes the company's arbitration agreement for at least five different reasons and then does not state which of those reasons are determinative. In other words, the court failed to state whether it would have en forced the agreement if any of the issues it iden tified had been addressed satisfactorily. Two months later, however, the Ninth Circuit did pro vide some guidance when it enforced an arbitra tion agreement in Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed.52 In this case the court held that the agreement was not "procedurally unconscionable" because the company did not "require" the employee to sign the pre-dispute agreement. Instead, the em ployee could opt out of the arbitration program during the first 30 days of employment. Employ ees who did not opt out were covered by the policy. Unfortunately, this opinion does not state whether this particular Circuit City arbitration agreement mirrored the one at issue in Circuit City II. According to those familiar with the case and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, however, the agreements in Ahmed and Circuit City II were substantially the same. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that a substantively unconscionable agree ment is enforceable as long as it is not procedur ally unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and clarified this holding three months later in Circuit City v. Najd.53 In N ajdthe Ninth Circuit stated that the agreements in Circuit City II and Ahmed (and presumably Najd) were "materially identical." Thus, the Ninth Circuit' s holding is clear: substantively unconscionable agreements are enforceable as long as they are not procedurally unconscionable. That is, employees may choose to agree to an "unfair" arbitration agreement like the one at issue in Circuit City II, but they cannot be forced into such an inequitable agreement.
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states: " [w] here appropriate and to the extent autho rized by law, the use of alternative dispute reso lution including...arbitration, is encouraged to 52 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002 ). 53 294 F.3d. 1104 (9,h Cir. 2002 The EEOC will ask either: (1) the entire set of Ninth Circuit judges to review the case, or (2) the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue. If both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court refuse the request, the issue will be over. If either one accepts the case, there will be more litiga tion. For now, however, the Section 118 issue is resolved.
The Law of the Ninth Circuit
Under the Ahmed and Najd holdings, unconscio nable pre-dispute agreements are enforceable so long as they are not offered on a take-it-or-leaveit basis. Employee-rights advocates should be con cerned about those decisions. Enforcing a sub stantively unconscionable pre-dispute arbitration agreement simply because signing it was optional at the time of hire is, put simply, bad law. Profes sor Sam Estreicher contends that the beginning of an employment relationship is similar to the beginning of a love affair between two people. Both sides, according to Estreicher, want this re lationship to last, neither anticipates any prob lems, and both are willing to make seemingly small sacrifices to get the relationship off on the right foot. Accordingly, Estreicher predicts that most employees will sign anything at the time of hire.58 Employers therefore have a perverse in centive to create unfair, one-sided agreements Enforcing a substantively unconscion able pre-dispute arbitration agree ment simply because signing it was optional at the time of hire is, put simply, bad law.
with opt-out provisions. Such agreements: (1) will satisfy the Ninth Circuit s standards, and (2) bind employees because it is unlikely that new hires will assertively opt out of such agreements (nei ther Najd nor Ahmed opted out, for example).
In addition to creating a perverse incentive, those holdings invite a question. The question can be framed as follows: If courts will enforce a substantively unconscionable agreement as long as it is not procedurally unconscionable, will the courts enforce a procedurally unconscionable agreement as long as it is not substantively un conscionable? In other words, can a take-it-orleave-it offer (which the Ninth Circuit deemed procedurally unconscionable) be enforceable if the agreement is not substantively unconscio nable? Based on how the Ahmed and Najd courts applied Circuit City Ifs holding that: "Under California law, a contract is unenforceable if both procedurally and substantively unconscio nable,"59 it seems clear that an agreement might be enforceable if it is procedurally or substan tively unconscionable, but not if it is procedur-58 Professor Estreicher made those comments at the first annual Hospitality Industry Labor and Employment Law Round Table, The Meaning of "Fair"
Outside of the Ninth Circuit the general rule is that mandatory arbitration agreements are legal as long as they are "fair." Despite the fact that neither the U.S. Congress nor the Supreme Court has defined what constitutes a "fair" arbitration agreement, and despite the fact that there are those of the mind that there is no such thing as a "fair" arbitration agreement, enough authority exists on the issue to propose some reliable and comprehensive guidelines. In examining fairness, Gilmer and its progeny focus on the following seven issues: (1) who pays the costs of arbitra tion, (2) the procedures for selecting the arbitra tor, (3) mutuality, (4) whether the employee en tered into the agreem ent know ingly and voluntarily, (5) available damages, (6) the method of delivering opinions, and (7) discovery.60 As discussed above, the Circuit City II court exam ined the first four issues and set standards for each. Those standards are not, however, the law outside of the Ninth Circuit. Still, with respect to the first three issues, one can ensure enforce ability if the employer pays the entire cost of the arbitration, both parties must have a substantial role in selecting the arbitrator, and both sides agree that arbitration will be the exclusive forum for both parties.
With respect to take-it-or-leave-it offers, only the Ninth Circuit holds such terms to be uncon scionable. In the rest of the country, arbitration agreements are enforceable so long as they clearly describe the terms of the agreement (e.g., the agreements must state that discrimination claims are covered and that the document being signed is a binding legal contract) and are not hidden in an employee handbook or some other long and 60 The Supreme Court in Gilmer reiterated the so-called savings clause of § 2 of the FAA (arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"). See: Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33; and 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Court also stated that " [t] here is no indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or de frauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his regis tration application. " Id. intimidating document.61 This is the case even if the arbitration is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
There is conflicting authority on how (and whether) arbitration agreements may limit dam ages available to prevailing parties. Case law and a mass of scholarly work support the argument that arbitration agreements must permit an arbi trator to award the same damages that would be available to parties had they prevailed in court.62 Alternatively, there are cases holding and others implying that arbitration agreements are enforce able even if they limit damages to less than what the prevailing parties might be entitled to had their case been heard in court.63 Last, arbitration agreements should provide for written opinions, and agreements must allow for at least some dis covery, even if it is limited.
What This Means for Employers
Mandatory arbitration is an effective way to re duce the costs of litigation. While the law is not completely settled, employers in almost all juris dictions can draft enforceable arbitration poli cies. Employers interested in pursuing such an option should contact counselors who have ex perience in drafting and litigating the enforce ability of arbitration agreements. M
